Health risk is increasingly viewed as an important form of background risk that affects household portfolio decisions. However, its role might be mediated by the presence of a protective full-coverage National Health System that could reduce households' probability of incurring current and future out-of-pocket medical expenditures. In this paper, we first sketch a theoretical framework in which household portfolio decisions are a function of both individual and systemic characteristics. Then, we test its main implications based on SHARE data, studying the influence of current health status and future health risk on the decision to hold risky assets, across 10 European countries with different health care systems, each offering a different degree of protection against out-of-pocket medical expenditures. We find robust empirical confirmation of our model implications, since perceived health condition matters more than objective health condition and, consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of background risk, health risk affects portfolio choices only in countries with less protective healthcare systems. Furthermore, portfolio decisions consistent with background risk models are observed only with respect to middle-aged and highlyeducated investors.
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1 From a theoretical point of view health risk is not uninsurable, as it is possible to buy health insurance to cover any medical expense. Nevertheless, despite the fact that markets for health insurance exist, they are far from perfect. Furthermore, as argued by Edwards (2005) , "The depreciation of health over time weakens the ability of individuals to dynamically insure against future health shocks." The same was found by Goldman and Maestas (2007) , who consider medical expenditure risk to be part of background risk as it is "not fully insurable and largely beyond one's control." Based on these arguments, health risk might well be considered an uninsurable risk. 2 The decision to hold supplementary health insurance might be endogenous with respect to the decision to hold risky assets. This issue is taken into account by jointly modelling these two decisions, whereby identification comes from factors that explain the decision to hold supplemental insurance but not the decision to hold risky assets (specifically the price and market penetration of supplementary insurance as well as state supplemental insurance regulation.) Coile and Milligan (2009) also use HRS to study the influence of ageing and health shocks on household portfolio choices at both the extensive and intensive margin, and find that health shocks play an important role in explaining changes in household portfolios over time. Pang and Warshawsky (2010) derive the optimal allocation in equity, bond and annuity for retired households facing, among other expenses, uninsured health expenses. Based on simulations calibrated on 1992-2004 HRS data, the authors find that in both the absence and presence of an annuity market, the greater the risk of uninsured health expenses, the safer the resulting portfolio allocation.
Cardak and Wilkins (2009) study a wide range of determinants of the portfolio allocation decisions of Australian households, using the Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. The share of risky assets held in financial portfolios is significantly and negatively affected by poor health status. Nonetheless, health status becomes insignificant once risk and time preference variables are included, thereby suggesting an indirect effect of health on the portfolio allocation decision via its effects on risk and time preferences. Interestingly, while the magnitude of the health effect is somewhat larger for employed households, health status does not seem to be a significant determinant of risky asset holding for retired households, which soundly contrasts with results reported for US households. The authors argue that Australia's universal health care system might well play a role in explaining this difference, but do not take this element explicitly into account in their empirical analyses.
In a recent contribution, Christelis et al. (2010) examine the relationship between cognitive abilities and stockholding, both at the extensive and intensive margins. To this end, they use data for several European countries from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE.) The results show that good cognitive abilities increase the propensity to invest in stocks but not the share invested in them.
In sum, the existing literature widely agrees on a relevant (direct or indirect) effect of health on household portfolio decisions. Nonetheless, this literature is still scant in at least two respects. First, most of the empirical contributions focus on the US, with European countries rarely considered, with the notable exception of Christelis et al. (2010) . Second, in general, cross-country comparison is rarely performed. Thus the role of different National Health Systems in affecting household portfolios cannot be taken into account, with Cardak and Wilkins (2009) solely citing this issue. With our analyses we endeavor to fill these gaps.
The organization of health care systems in SHARE countries: an overview
The countries included in SHARE have quite different health care systems, as described in Allin et al. (2005) . 3 In Austria, about 95% of the population is covered by mandatory health insurance and 2% are covered by voluntary health insurance, while the remaining 3% are not covered at all. In Belgium, the system is based on compulsory social health insurance, which reimburses OOP medical care expenditures depending on the nature of the service, the legal status of the provider and the status of the insured person. In addition, sickness funds offer complementary health insurance. Denmark has a tax-based, decentralized health system providing universal coverage for all residents. The French national social insurance system has three main schemes: a general scheme (covering about 84% of the population), an agricultural scheme (7%), and a self-employed scheme (5%). This system is complemented by voluntary (private) health insurance, which now covers over 95% of the population and is free for low-income individuals. The German health system is based on three co-existing schemes: about 87% of the population has statutory (either mandatory or voluntary) health insurance, about 10% of the population has private health insurance, while only the remaining 3% is covered by governmental schemes. In Greece, the National Health System coexists with compulsory social insurance and voluntary private health insurance. The former provides universal coverage and operates on the principles of equity and equal access to health services for all. In addition, 97% of the population is covered by approximately 35 different social insurance funds, and another 8% maintains complementary voluntary health insurance bought on the private insurance market. The Italian and Spanish National Health Systems share very similar features as they are both primarily financed through general taxation, and grant universal access to a uniform level of care throughout the country. As a consequence, in both countries private health insurance is not particularly widespread (purchased by 10% of the Italian population and 18% of the Spanish population). Moreover, when private health insurance is present, it is typically used to purchase additional services not provided by the National Health System or to avoid waiting for services. Similarly, Sweden has a predominantly tax-based health care system that covers the entire resident population, thus voluntary insurance is very limited there and typically serves only to provide supplementary coverage. In The Netherlands, the National Health System covers only "exceptional medical expenses" (long-term care or high-cost treatments); all other forms of medical expenditures are covered by compulsory sickness funds (around 65% of the population), private health insurance (30%), or servants' health insurance (5%). Finally, the Swiss health care system shares several features with the Dutch system (see Leu et al., 2009) in that it provides universal coverage through multiple private insurers in a regulated competitive market.
Based on these features, countries can be classified into three groups: (i) countries such as Denmark, Italy, Spain and Sweden that enjoy a (generally tax-based) National Health System (NHS) which grants full coverage for a comprehensive package of medical expenditures (especially for more serious health events that must be treated in a hospital); (ii) countries such as The Netherlands and Switzerland, where medical expenditures are primarily covered by private health insurance; and (iii) the remaining countries, namely Austria, France, Germany and Greece, that are somewhere in between, with public health systems coexisting with several forms of private health insurance. In other words, all countries in groups (ii) and (iii) lack a fully protective, universal coverage National Health System and are hence classified in Table 1 as non-NHS countries (Panel B), while countries in group (i) are classified as NHS countries.
Methodological Approach

The theoretical framework
In our framework, households allocate their financial wealth across different assets that are heterogeneous in terms of risk. In making their portfolio decisions, households are influenced by the degree of medical expenditure risk they face, which in turn depends on their actual and expected future health status as well as on the presence of a National Health System which shelters against these risks.
In this framework, the portfolio choices of household i living in country j could be formalized as follows:
where Y i,j could either be a binary variable indicating the presence of risky assets in the financial portfolios in the participation decision (extensive margin), or a continuous variable indicating the financial portfolio share held in risky assets (Y i,j ∈[0,1]) in the allocation decision (intensive margin). On the other hand, , i j X and j S represent individual and system-wide observable characteristics, respectively. Since they might affect portfolio decisions, through different channels, in what follows we provide some theoretical justifications.
Individual characteristics
The decision to hold risky financial assets is determined by a set of socio-economic individual characteristics as well as by a set of variables that capture the role played by health status.
For the former, we rely on the widely accepted results reported in the household finance literature and allow portfolio choices to be a function of observable characteristics such as income, wealth, age, gender, marital status and education, as well as social interactions and cognitive abilities.
Concerning health status, the existing literature has thus far only considered the effects of Current Health Status (CHS) on portfolio decisions, without investigating the role of Future Health Risk (FHR). In fact, it might be that both aspects could independently affect portfolio decisions. As an example, we can imagine that good current health but higher future health risk should lead to higher out-of-pocket health expenditures in the future and hence should be associated with a less risky portfolio profile.
This implies that the degree to which FHR affects portfolio decisions will depend on the degree to which individuals are myopic or forward looking. Hence, an interesting implication of this theoretical framework is that it might shed some light on how agents behave in shaping their portfolio decisions with respect to their current and future health conditions. For example, if our model highlights a role for both CHS and FHR, then forward-looking behaviour could be inferred; otherwise, if only CHS matters then we might infer myopic behaviour. Furthermore, we can identify if on average households behave consistently with background risk portfolio models, i.e. if they respond to poorer CHS and/or to higher FHR by reducing their exposure to financial risk.
Furthermore, within Current Health Status we distinguish between Perceived Health Status and Objective Health Status, assuming that how household members currently feel might affect their financial portfolio choices differently than if they were basing their decisions on how household members actually are in terms of health condition.
System-wide characteristics
Individual health-related characteristics may affect portfolio decisions differently depending on the health care system existing in each country. In fact, the presence of a universal National Health System (NHS) offering full or nearly full coverage for unexpected future health expenditures might act as a shelter against high current and/or future health risk, thereby reducing the overall background risk. In such a case, health-related individual characteristics should play a minor role, if any, in shaping portfolio choices. By contrast, whenever full public coverage is not guaranteed, individual health-related characteristics should play a more relevant role. Equation (1) can thus be rewritten as follows:
where CHS and FHR represent respectively the Current Health Status and Future Health Risk, PHS and OHS represent respectively the Perceived Health Status and Objective Health Status, ,
X refers to the individual non-health-related characteristics (i.e. socio-economic and demographic observables), and j S captures the organization of the health care system in country j.
The empirical specification
As a crude indicator of the degree of protection against health risks offered by the health care system, we use a binary variable assuming value 1 whenever the household lives in a country with a fully protective NHS systems (namely Sweden, Spain, Italy and Denmark, see Table 1 ), and 0 otherwise. This allows for splitting the sample into two subsamples containing households living in countries with and without NHS, respectively. From an empirical perspective, this strategy also allows for the adoption of a more flexible specification that should better highlight the role of health care systems in shaping household portfolio choices.
The empirical counterpart of Eq. (2) is obtained assuming the following direct relationship between the dependent variable and the set of regressors:
where subscripts i refer to the household, j to the country and k to the category to which the country belongs (1 for countries with NHS, 0 otherwise Furthermore, it is well known that education enhances financial literacy 4 and financial literacy has a positive effect on the probability of holding risky assets. However, education may also affect health literacy. If highly educated patients are more knowledgeable about their health risk factors, they may place greater weight on their Future Health Risk when making portfolio decisions. In other words, how health information is perceived and internalized by agents might play a crucial role in shaping portfolio decisions. In our empirical model we take this into account by interacting FHR with the higher-education dummy variable. A negative coefficient on the interaction term would be consistent with the notion that in response to greater Future Health Risk more educated households reduce risky asset holding more than less educated households.
Finally, the informative content of FHR should be higher for middle-aged households than for older ones. In fact, at the age of 50 many health problems might still be latent and not realized, and thus households might still be forming their expectations of their future health conditions. On the other hand, by age 70, health problems are likely to have already manifested and hence are incorporated into Current Health Status rather than into Future Health Risk assessment. In addition, middle-aged households typically expect a longer life span, and hence have a longer investment horizon than older households. As a result, every factor needed for future planning, such as FHR, should be more relevant for middle-aged households than elderly ones. This implies a certain degree of heterogeneity in the role played by FHR depending on the age of the household's financial respondent: the older the household, the lower the relevance of FHR.
In summary, the specification in Eq. (3) In the following sections we present the empirical results that will allow us to test these theoretical implications.
The data
The dataset
Our data are from the 2004 Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which surveys households with at least one member aged 50 or older in the following countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium and Israel, for a total of 45,051 individuals in 21,336 households.
We focus on households whose financial respondent is aged up to 90 years (dropping less than 1.5% of total sample.) Furthermore, we drop those observations for which not all variables relevant for our analyses were available, most of which referred to Belgium and Israel, as well as those (9 observations) with out-of-pocket budget share exceeding 200%, as this unreasonable value probably encompasses some measurement error (see Hurd and Rohwedder, 2009.) 5 The resulting sample is then composed of 11,793 individuals and 5,902 households. 6 In addition to standard demographic variables (including age, gender, marital and occupational status, education), SHARE provides detailed information on health, cognitive status, and a variety of economic and financial variables, including PPP-adjusted net wealth, gross income and household total consumption. SHARE also reports detailed information on households' financial wealth allocation in a comprehensive set of financial instruments, namely: i) bank, transaction or saving accounts; ii) government or corporate bonds; iii) stocks or shares (listed or unlisted on stock market); iv) mutual funds or managed investment accounts; v) Individual Retirements Accounts (IRAs); vi) contractual saving for housing; and vii) term or whole life insurance policies. The indication of the main investment profile for mutual funds and IRAs ("mostly in stocks," "mostly in bonds" or "half stocks and half bonds") allows an even more precise classification of these assets. To facilitate comparison with the relevant literature on portfolio allocation (see e.g. Guiso et al. (2002) , Hurd (2002) , Rosen and Wu (2004) and Brunetti and Torricelli, 2010), we collapse these assets into three main groups with relatively homogeneous risk-profiles, namely "safe," "fairly safe" and "risky" assets (see Table  2) 7 .
Definition and construction of health status indicators
Based on the information provided by SHARE, we are able to construct different health status indicators.
As proxy for Current Health Status (CHS) we use two different measures: Perceived Health Status and Objective Health Status. Concerning Perceived Health Status (PHS), we use either a discrete variable or a dummy variable. In the former case, it is obtained as the average evaluation of the overall health condition that all respondents in the households have provided based on a 5-point scale.
8 In contrast, the dummy indicator is obtained by constructing a variable assuming value 1 whenever the average household perceived health status goes from fair (3.0) to very bad (5.0), and 0 otherwise, signalling a health status which is perceived as poor, overall . Both specifications of PHS variables should capture how households subjectively judge their current overall health.
By contrast, the Objective Health Status (OHS) indicator should capture the health condition of the household members based on a series of chronic diseases assumed to be diagnosed by a physician, but self-reported by the respondent. They include heart attack, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, diabetes, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, Parkinson's and cancer. We construct the OHS indicator as a weighted index in which each diagnosed disease is weighted with a set of weights derived according to the disease's degree of severity and the implied disability.
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Concerning Future Health Risk (FHR), households are assumed to base their assessment on relevant health information available at time t, such as the undertaking of risky behaviours, the suffering from a selection of objectively diagnosed but asymptomatic diseases, as well as the Grip Strength (GS). More specifically, we define FHR as:
It then follows that FHR is an increasing function of the average number of Risky Behaviours (RB) undertaken by the households' members at time t (i.e. smoking, drinking, and a sedentary lifestyle), as well as an increasing function of the Asymptomatic Objective Health Status (AOHS), measured as the average number of diseases diagnosed by a doctor that are currently asymptomatic but might entail health worsening in the future (i.e. high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol and osteoporosis). 11 On the other hand, FHR is assumed to be a decreasing function of the average household's members GS, since it is proven to be a powerful predictor of functional decline, disability and mortality (see e.g. Laukkanen et al. 1995 , Rantanen et al. 1999 and Syddall et al. 2003 .
Other controls
Following the large body of empirical literature, household participation decision is further modelled by controlling for a series of standard observables which should be highly associated with the household participation decision. These include linear and quadratic terms of household total income and net wealth, the latter being the sum of the financial and real assets of a household (hence including the value of owned property) net of financial liabilities. Both income and net wealth are PPP-adjusted and expressed in thousand Euros. We also include household size, defined as the number of members in the household. All these variables should capture the household budget constraint. Furthermore, the decision to hold risky assets is assumed to be associated with a series of socio-demographic indicators for the financial respondent of the household, namely age, both in linear and quadratic terms to capture the life-cycle effect, gender and marital status, to capture possible gaps between male and female and married and non-married agents' preferences, as well as an indicator capturing the level of education. Education systems in SHARE countries are highly heterogeneous; therefore a direct comparison between achieved educational qualifications is difficult. Hence, for the education indicator we rely on the completed years of education rather than the educational degrees achieved. Furthermore, given the composition of the SHARE sample, in which the average age is slightly under 65 years, most of the individuals interviewed had not even completed the compulsory education program. We thus define as highly educated those households whose financial respondent attended at least one year beyond the current compulsory full education process, which on average takes 9 years. The indicator for highly educated households is thus defined as a binary variable assuming value 1 if the number of completed years of education is higher than or equal to 9. Inspired by the results recently reported in Christelis et al. (2010), we also include some indicators for social interactions and cognitive abilities. The former are captured by two binary variables, namely Social Activities, assuming value 1 in the case of participation in sport, social, political or other community-related associations during the last month, and Religion, assuming value 1 in the case of participation in a religious organization during the same time period. Cognitive abilities are measured by three different measures, each measuring different aptitudes which might be relevant to financial investing, specifically: i) numeracy, i.e. the ability to perform numerical operations, measured based on the number of correct answers given to 5 questions on simple computations; ii) fluency, i.e. the ability to read and understand texts (e.g. financial news), which is measured based on the number of animals named in 1 minute; and iii) recall, i.e. the ability to compare facts and situations at distant points in time, which is measured by the number of words recalled out of 10.
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Finally, the bequest motive, which might extend a household's investment horizon and hence affect the probability of holding risky assets, enters via the probability of leaving an inheritance worth 50,000 Euros or more. Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Around 31% of the households in the sample live in a country with a protective NHS. The average household has slightly more than 2 members, who earn a yearly income of around 43,800 € and can count on a net wealth of about 377 thousand €. The financial respondent is around 64 years old and has almost 11 years of education. Around 59% of households are married, one fifth is widowed, 9% are divorced, and 9% never married. As for cognitive abilities, the average household is quite skilled at performing numerical operations (numeracy equal to 3.4 on a scale from 1 to 5), while presenting problems with memory (recall around 5 on a scale from 0 to 10) and language fluency (19 names of animal in one minute.) The share of households participating in a religious community is around 14%, while those active in some type of social activity are around 29% of the total sample. Bequest motives are evident in that the average probability of leaving an inheritance is around 60%, and the probability of leaving more than 150,000€ is as high as 40%. As for health condition, the average Perceived Health Status is between 2 (good) and 3 (fair), and almost one third of the households in the sample judge their overall subjective health status as poor.
Descriptive statistics
Around 19.3 % of households in the sample hold risky assets in their financial portfolios. Nevertheless, there is a strong variation in this participation rate across households with different Perceived Health Status (see Table 4 .) Consistent with expectations and with what is reported in the literature, households with better health status have on average a higher probability of holding risky assets than those with a poorer health condition.
In a cross-country comparison, the average participation rate is quite disparate across European countries. In countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy the share of households holding risky assets is around 10%, while in countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland households holding risky assets in their financial portfolios are much more widespread (see Table 4 .) Clearly, this heterogeneity stems from several factors, ranging from the development of each country's financial market to the average level of financial education of households. Nonetheless, countries such as Denmark and Sweden that enjoy a full-coverage NHS are among those with households that on average display a higher propensity to hold risky assets, while in other countries where the NHS is less "generous," such as Austria or Greece, households choose less risky assets, on average. In fact, the participation rate in countries with a protective NHS is on average higher than in those countries without a full coverage NHS.
This descriptive evidence seems to be not only consistent with health being a source of background risk for households but also suggests that different healthcare systems might contribute to the heterogeneity in financial decisions and that the presence of a protective NHS in particular could play a role in shaping portfolio decisions.
In the next section we estimate the sensitivity of portfolio participation decision to Current Health Status as well as to Future Health Risk, trying to isolate the effect of a protective National Health System and controlling for a series of standard socio-economic observable characteristics.
Econometric analysis
Most of the existing literature analyzes the effect of health status on household portfolio choices by including in the empirical model a measure for Perceived Health Status (PHS) on either a 1 to 5 scale (see footnote 8) or more often as a dummy representing poor health status. On the other hand, Objective Health Status (OHS) is only rarely taken into account and to the best of our knowledge none of the existing contributions has introduced a measure such as FHR. 13 Thus, in order to make our results comparable with the existing literature we first run a restricted specification of Equation (3), in which the FHR parameters (α 2,k , and α 3,k ) are set equal to zero. Next, we run a full specification in which all parameters in Equation (3) are estimated.
In both cases a Probit model is estimated as the dependent variable models for the binary decision to hold risky assets in the household's financial portfolio. Besides the health indicators, all specifications also include a set of standard socio-economic and demographic controls as well as country dummies, whereby the baseline household is a household living in Switzerland (an extreme low public coverage country in Europe), whose financially responsible party is non-married and female 14 .
Restricted specification
We estimate three different model specifications according to the different definitions of Current Health Status considered: (1) uses a binary indicator for poor PHS; (2) uses a discrete measure of the household's average PHS; and (3) uses a measure capturing the OHS as defined in Section 5.2. Following our reasoning in Section 4.2, results for both subsamples (countries with and without NHS) are reported in Table 5 .
Across both samples and different model specifications the standard control variables exhibit robust estimates and expected signs. The probability of participating in the stock market rises with income and wealth but at a decreasing rate, confirming the well-known humped-shaped pattern (although full statistical significance is reached only in non-NHS countries).
15 Age-coefficients are not statistically significant. Though that may seem somewhat surprising, it is reasonable given that the SHARE sample includes individuals older than 50 years, and thus the focus is on the last phase 13 Delavande and Rohwedder (2010) is the only contribution we are aware of that makes an effort in the same direction, although portfolio choices are analyzed as a function of the uncertainty about future social security system rather than on individual health condition. 14 Since the SHARE survey presents problems with non-response units, all estimates have been weighted using the variable "wgtach" (Calibrated household weight for the two samples -vignette and main sample -jointly) provided by SHARE. According to SHARE documentation, these are calibrated weights that compensate, although only to some extent, for unit non-response (see page 19 of Short information on generated variables: Weights in SHARE documentation, see http://www.share-project.org/t3/share/fileadmin/pdf_FAQ/SHARE1rel2-0-1_GV_weights.pdf) 15 As a robustness check, we also tried a more flexible specification by including in the model quintile dummies for households' total income and net wealth, finding qualitatively similar results.
of the life cycle. Gender and marital status gaps in investment decisions are both confirmed, as households headed by males and married individuals are on average more inclined to hold risky assets compared to those headed by females and singles, respectively. More education, which is likely associated with higher financial literacy, is positively associated with holding risky assets, although its effect is not precisely estimated. Social activities, such as participation in a sport or political association, are associated with a higher likelihood of investing in risky assets, though the effect is statistically relevant only in NHS countries. In both subsamples religion coefficient is negative but not relevant for the participation decision, while the bequest motive is strongly statistically significant and positively associated with the decision to hold risky assets, consistent with the idea that a bequest motive lengthens the investment horizon of the household. As for cognitive abilities, similarly to Christelis et al. (2010) we find that numeracy, fluency and recall all seem to be positively associated with the decision to participate. However, despite finding very similar results in terms of magnitude, the effects seem to be statistically significant only for numeracy and fluency and only in non-NHS countries.
More importantly, the two subsamples differ substantially in terms of the health-related variables. Both Perceived Health Status specifications (dummy and discrete, see columns (1) and (2)), whenever significant, are negatively signed, suggesting an inverse relationship between current perceived health status and the probability of holding risky assets. However, these variables are strongly significant only in the non-NHS subsample. In other words, in NHS countries health condition is not associated with portfolio decisions, while the opposite is true for non-NHS countries. Additionally, Objective Health Status (see columns (3)) parameters are never statistically significant, even in non-NHS countries, suggesting that in making financial portfolio decisions households seem to rely more on perceived health status than objective health status 16 .
Full specification
The results for the full specification, which includes both Current Health Status and Future Health Risk variables, are reported for both subsamples in Table 6 .
As in the restricted model, Perceived Health Status does not matter in countries with a protective NHS, while it does in those without a NHS. The absence of a full-coverage NHS, which shelters against the risk of unexpected health expenses, might amplify background risk, thereby discouraging the decision to hold risky assets. A role for a protective NHS in affecting households' portfolio decisions might thus be evident. Furthermore, the difference between NHS and non-NHS countries holds even when considering the coefficients of FHR and its interaction with the education variable. Neither coefficient is not statistically significant in the NHS sample, while both are statistically significant in the non-NHS subsample. In other words, the participation decision of households living in countries that lack a protective NHS seems to be associated not only with Current Health Status but also with Future Health Risk (FHR), pointing towards forward-looking behaviour. Strikingly, the coefficients on the main effect of FHR and its interaction with education indicate that as Future Health Risk increases, less educated households are more likely to hold risky assets, suggesting behaviour that is inconsistent with background risk portfolio choice theory. In contrast, as Future Health Risk increases, more educated households are less likely to hold risky assets, in line with theory. The effects of Future Health Risk for more and less educated households nearly offset one another, resulting in an average effect over all households that is small and negative. This result is quite interesting as it seems to support the rationality hypothesis: an agent is rational if and only if he jointly has access to the right amount of information and knows how to use it.
The remaining economics and socio-demographic variables have signs and statistical significances unaltered with respect to the restricted model and are quite robust across all specifications.
The results presented thus far provide evidence that both current and future health status play independent roles in affecting portfolio decisions and that these effects are apparent only in countries that lack a protective NHS, therefore suggesting that a NHS might indeed play a role in shaping households' participation decisions. In what follows, we refine our analysis in order to eliminate potential confounding factors.
A further look at the role of Future Health Risk
A potential confounding effect in analysing the role of FHR could originate from the varying degrees of importance that FHR may have at different points in the lifecycle. In fact, FHR is intended to predict future health problems based on current objective health status as well as current risky behaviours. Hence, it should be considered a valuable source of information, particularly for younger households. While by age 70 or over many health problems might have already materialized, at age 50 many such problems might still be latent, and middle-aged households might still be forming and updating expectations about their future health status.
Therefore, the FHR coefficient presented in Table 6 is an average effect across households at different points in their life cycle, for which the informative content of FHR might be more or less relevant. This confounding effect may be removed by splitting the sample into subsamples based on the financial respondent's age class. In doing this we expect to find differences between middleaged and older households, with FHR having a stronger effect for the first group, compared to the second. Table 7 reports the coefficients for the variables of interest, estimated on subsamples obtained according to the following financial respondent's age-classes: 50-54, 55-59, 60-69, 70-79 and 80-90 (with the last classes spanning 10 years rather than 5 to allow for reasonable sample sizes). As expected, the effect is now clearer compared to what was observed in Table 6 : FHR coefficients for the middle-aged class (50-54) are now strongly statistically significant and much higher in magnitude. At the same time, for the highly educated households, the effect of FHR is still negative and now more than offsets the value of FHR for less educated households (although the negative net effect is still small.) By contrast, these effects disappear when moving across age classes toward older individuals.
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This evidence confirms that the informative content of FHR varies over the life cycle, progressively declining with age. Furthermore, this evidence is again supportive of a forwardlooking attitude consistent with background-risk theory only for middle-aged and highly educated households. In conclusion, our empirical findings seem to fully support all theoretical implications discussed in section 4.2.
Robustness checks
In order to test the robustness of the results reported, in this section we check to what extent they change based on: i) adopting a specification without CHS by the households' members; ii) alternative definitions of the CHS variable; iii) alternative specification of the FHR variable; iv) alternative FHR interaction terms; v) inclusion of households' life expectancy; and vi) different definitions of bequest motive.
Model without CHS.
Since the assessment of FHR is based on information collected at time t, it may be argued that CHS and FHR variables are strictly correlated, with the former capturing most of the variation in portfolio participation decision, relegating FHR in a non-statistically significant position. According to the statistical correlation among the two variables (see Table 8 ) this does not seem to be the case, and indeed running a model specification in which the parameters of Current (both Perceived and Objective) Health Status have been set to zero (see Table 9 ), FHR still retains the magnitude and statistical significance as in Table 6 , confirming that the results presented in the previous Section are not an artifact of our model specification.
Alternative definitions of Current Health Status
As an alternative to PHS as a dummy or as a discrete variable, we first split the latter PHS into 5 distinct categories and then included in the model a set of relative dummies, each capturing the average PHS as being Good, Fair, Bad and Very Bad (Very Good is left as a reference category.) In this way we allow for a non-linear relationship with our dependent variable. As reported in Column 1 in Table 10 , also in this new specification the inverse relationship between PHS and the probability of holding risky assets is confirmed, with the coefficients increasing overall in absolute terms with the worsening of Perceived Health Condition. Furthermore, the effect of Perceived Health Condition is apparent even in NHS countries, although lower in magnitude with respect to non-NHS countries and only for extremely bad health conditions.
As a second alternative, PHS is substituted with OOP budget share, defined as the share of outof-pocket medical expenditures faced by the household over total household consumption. The rationale for using this variable is that a higher level of expenses for medical care should be associated with a somehow worse current health status and could hence proxy for it. According to the results reported in Column 2 of Table 10, the OOP budget share is not associated with the participation decision, neither in the NHS sample nor in the non-NHS. A possible explanation is that the OOP budget share might not properly approximate for current health conditions, as it depends not only on household's perceived and objective health conditions, but also on household's consumption patterns, and hence on its overall economic conditions. Nonetheless, all other results for FHR and its interaction with the education variable are confirmed overall.
We also tested different specifications for the variable capturing household's Objective Health Status. More specifically, instead of the synthetic weighted index OHS, we either include: (i) the Grip Strength of household members; (ii) each disease separately, as measured by a dummy assuming value 1 if suffered by at least one household member, 0 otherwise; or (iii) each disease separately, as measured by a categorical variable counting the number of household members suffering from each disease. Grip Strength turns out to be statistically significant only in the non-NHS subsample, although only weakly and only in one specification (see Columns 1 and 2 of Table  11 .) Turning to each disease separately (see Columns 3 through 6 of Table 11), we find across all specifications that for non-NHS countries only Parkinson's turns out to be statistically significant (and correctly signed), while for NHS countries participation decision seems to be inversely associated only with stomach and femoral diseases. This could be reconciled with our hypothesis on the sheltering effect of the NHS, since in these countries households suffering from Parkinson's (among the most problematic and costly diseases), do not reduce their exposure to risky assets, while the opposite occurs in non-NHS countries.
Most importantly, FHR variable and its interaction with higher education appears to be robust in terms of both signs and magnitudes across all different specifications, thereby providing evidence of the robustness of our main results.
Alternative specification of Future Health Risk
In the analyses performed thus far, we assumed a multiplicative definition of FHR (see Equation (4)). In this subsection a linear specification for FHR (LFHR) is instead assumed, i.e.:
The new variable ranges between -72 and 6 (as before, the higher the value, the higher the risk for future health worsening), with a sample weighted mean (standard deviation) of -30.09 (0.1562). Since this specification allows a lower degree of variation, we end up with less precise estimates. In fact, as reported in Table 12 , the coefficient for LFHR retains the sign and the statistical significance of the FHR coefficients in Table 6 , but its interaction with higher education is not statistically significant. However, the key results are confirmed: the participation decision is associated with perceived but not with objective health status. FHR also plays an independent role, but in both cases these effects are apparent only in those countries lacking a fully protective NHS. 
Alternative interpretation of FHR interaction term
According to the results of our fully specified model, the coefficient on the interaction between Future Health Risk and the High Education dummy is negative, meaning that highly educated households on average reduce their exposure to risky assets in the presence of worse FHR. We interpret this as sign that better educated households are more able to fully internalize FHR, while less educated households are not. Nonetheless, since education is typically highly correlated with income, an alternative explanation could be that less educated households do not behave as expected just because they have lower levels of income, i.e. they are financially constrained.
We thus estimate an alternative model in which we interact FHR with the household's income (FHR*INCOME) rather than with the High Education dummy. If the new interaction term has the same sign and magnitude of the one used thus far, then we will not be able to isolate which of these two explanations is actually occurring. However, the results show that the coefficient on the interaction of FHR with income is never significant (see Table 13 ), suggesting that our original interpretation is the most appropriate one 19 .
FHR and the investment horizon
Our model specification with FHR intends to capture the weight that households attach to potential future health problems in shaping their participation decision. A possible alternative interpretation lies with the investment horizon. In addition to future health risk, our FHR measure (and all the other health-related variables) might also measure health-related variation in the investment horizon. We thus include in the specification the financial respondent's subjective life 18 The LFHR specification has also been tested across the different age-classes, obtaining results (available upon request) similar to those reported in subsection 6.3. 19 As a further check, the FHR interaction with both High Education and Income has been included. Results, available upon request, show that across the whole sample neither the interaction with High Education nor the one with Income reach statistical significance. However, by splitting the sample by age-class, the interaction with the High Education dummy still retains signs and significance for the 50-54 age class, while the interaction with Income is never significant, providing further evidence in support of our interpretation. expectancy, (i.e. the age to which they expect to live), as a proxy for the investment horizon. Table  14 shows that the coefficient on life expectancy is not significant across the full sample. Nevertheless, the relevance of the investor's horizon becomes apparent once we focus on younger investors for whom, as expected, a longer life span is associated with a higher probability of holding risky assets. Remarkably, NHS and non-NHS differ in this respect: in the former, life expectancy is relevant while health status is not, and in the latter the opposite is true. At the same time, the results for the FHR variables remain substantially unchanged for both the whole sample and by age class. This not only confirms the robustness of our results but also corroborates our main intuition: in countries where NHS provides full coverage for health problems, it is life expectancy and not health status during the lifetime that has an impact on financial choices, while in countries lacking NHS protection, households seem to shape their portfolio choices by taking their health, (i.e. how they (will) feel), into account more than how long they expect to live.
Alternative definitions of bequest motive.
SHARE provides three alternative definitions of bequest expectations: the chance of leaving an inheritance larger than 50,000 €, used so far, the chance of leaving an amount larger than 150,000 € and that of leaving any positive amount. Results obtained using the latter two definitions are reported in Table 15 .
As expected, the probability of leaving an inheritance worth more than 150,000€ is strongly statistically significant and positive, suggesting that such a strong bequest motive actually favours the holding of risky assets in financial portfolios. On the other hand, the coefficient for leaving an inheritance of any amount (i.e. even less than 50,000€) is only weakly, if at all, statistically significant, suggesting that milder bequest motives, captured by inheritances of smaller amounts, might not have the same effect. Despite these differences, the key parameters on current and future health status remain unaltered overall.
Conclusions
Household participation in financial markets is limited and the reasons that impede, limit or discourage this participation are the subject of lively debate. In this paper we analyse both individual and systemic characteristics that might affect this decision and focus on the roles played by households' health status and by the level of protection embodied in National Health Systems. To this end, we test the association between (current and expected future) health status and financial portfolio choices at the household level across 10 European countries, heterogeneous not only in terms of financial education and financial market development, but also in terms of National Health Systems. More specifically, we estimate a Probit model for the likelihood of holding risky financial assets on two different subsamples, countries with and without a NHS. In all cases we include country dummies and control for a set of standard socio-economic and demographic observables. Compared to the existing literature we innovate by introducing a composite indicator of Future Health Risk, based on current risky behaviours, in forming predictions about future health risks.
We provide robust evidence for all the implications of the theoretical framework based on background-risk we present, which can be summarized as follows.
As for individual characteristics, a household's decision to hold risky assets is driven mainly by Perceived rather than Objective Health Status. Consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of background risk, a worse current perceived health condition, entailing a higher risk of unexpected out-of-pocket medical expenditures, forces households to crowd out other sources of risks, including financial risks. Secondly, Future Health Risk retains an independent role: households shape their portfolios by taking into account not only their current but also their future health conditions, suggesting forward-looking attitude in this respect. However, and quite interestingly, a higher level of Future Health Risk is for lower educated individuals associated with a higher probability of holding risky assets, a prediction which is at odds with the portfolio choice models framed in background risk theory. Third, consistent with the way in which the indicator of Future Health Risk is constructed, its role is highly sensitive to the education and age of the investor. In fact, evidence of forward-looking behaviour is found only for highly-educated households, leading to an interpretation that leans toward the rationality hypothesis: it is jointly important to both have relevant information and to know how to use it, (i.e. to be able to fully understand it). Furthermore, since FHR aims to capture the risk for future health deterioration its role is particularly relevant for middle-aged households, while it vanishes for older households. This result should call for further investigation of younger households (not included in the SHARE dataset), whose investment horizon is longer for whom the role of FHR could be even stronger.
Turning to the systemic characteristics, households living in countries without a protective NHS lack a shelter against the risk of unexpected health expenses. This increases their overall degree of background risk and hence discourages their investment in risky financial assets. This suggests an important role for NHS in shaping households' portfolio decisions.
Besides the evidence provided, there are several issues that deserve further investigation. For instance, whether or not the same evidence holds true for other portfolio choices, including the degree of diversification (number of different financial assets held) and level of risk (share of total financial wealth held in risky assets) in a financial portfolio. Furthermore, health-related issues and in particular the role of Future Health Risk are likely to be particularly relevant for the financial choices of very young households who face a longer (and hence more uncertain) horizon. These and other related questions which require additional data beyond those we use in the present paper are left to further research. Note: weighted marginal effects, Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Country fixed effects included but not reported, with Switzerland as reference country. PHS dummy is a binary variable assuming value 1 for poor Perceived Health Status, while PHS discrete is the average Perceived Health Status of the households' members on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad). OHS is a weighted index for the household's Objective Health Status.
Monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted and in thousand Euros. 
